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Nuclear myths and Atlantic 
realities 
In the previous issue of Atlantisch Perspectief, Adam Lowther and Paul Schumacher expressed worry 
that cuts to defense budgets would leave the American nuclear force too small and unreliable to be 
effective, while these nuclear weapons are the cornerstone of the security of NATO and its members. 
Yet, their arguments are unconvincing. If anything, the United States and its NATO allies will only 
benefit if the alliance reduces its dependence on nuclear weapons.
nuclear weapons at when targeting such adversaries? A 
nuclear deterrent only deters when vital interests — those 
pertaining to the survival of the state — are at stake. As 
Kenneth Waltz argued, “potential attackers are deterred by 
the knowledge that attacking the vital interests of a country 
having nuclear weapons may bring the attacker untold los-
ses.”1 The reality is that in coming years, as in recent years, 
NATO will face threats such as terrorism, insurgency, ethnic 
and civil strife, and cyber conflict. The theaters of operation 
are not the territories of NATO members but weak, far-away 
countries without nuclear weapons, such as Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Somalia. Nuclear weapons serve 
neither battlefield use nor a deterrent purpose against such 
adversaries, in such conflicts, and in such locations.
The second argument Lowther & Schumacher bring to the 
table is that nuclear-armed Russia has never come close to 
NATO red lines due to the American nuclear umbrella and, 
presumably, the presence of TNWs on European soil. However, 
this supposed predatory intent on the part of Russia lacks any 
basis. Despite Cold War memories, NATO members recognize 
that Russia has neither the intention nor the ability to invade 
Europe. If anything, archival evidence from the Cold War 
shows that Soviet/Warsaw Pact war plans for Europe were de-
fensive and meant to respond to a possible attack by NATO.2 
Nuclear weapons and deterrence
The United States’ strategic nuclear force and particularly its 
forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe 
are widely credited with deterring Soviet aggression against 
the United States and its NATO allies during the Cold War. 
With the relevance of nuclear weapons having come into 
question after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Lowther 
& Schumacher ask whether the US and NATO can maintain 
credible deterrence without nuclear weapons.
In short, they contend that conventional weaponry, regard-
less of the superiority of one’s arsenal, cannot replicate 
the explosive and psychological effect of nuclear weap-
ons. They illustrate this with a reference to the use of the 
BLU-82 ‘Daisy Cutter’ — the largest conventional bomb in 
the US arsenal — to intimidate opponents in Afghanistan. 
Supposedly, the failure of this weapon to deter Al Qaeda 
and Taliban fighters, to whom they refer as “the weakest of 
adversaries”, is a testament to the continued relevance of 
nuclear weapons.
Of course, the premise is flawed. That conventional ‘mega 
bombs’ do little to deter terrorists and insurgents does 
not mean that nuclear weapons will. Where would one aim 
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An American missile silo with a ‘Minuteman’ ICBM. When TNWs are removed from European soil, the United States’ strategic nuclear 
weapons can still comfortably fulfill the role of NATO’s nuclear deterrent (photo: U.S. Department of Defense)
Vividly remembering the horrors of two World Wars, the Soviet 
leadership was effectively deterred by the prospect of a major 
conventional war; the presence of nuclear weapons just added 
to the declining appetite for war.3
There is no reason to believe that modern-day Russia will 
behave any worse in regards to Europe than the Soviet 
Union did during the darkest periods of the Cold War. Even 
if one is convinced that nuclear weapons are still needed 
to protect Europe from Russian adventurism, the deploy-
ment of TNWs on European soil is silly. Neither the current 
dual-capable aircraft tasked with delivering tactical nukes 
nor their envisioned replacements are capable of reaching 
Russia — or other real or imagined enemies, such as Iran, 
Saudi Arabia or Egypt — without refueling at least once. 
Even if these aircraft were capable of reaching the borders 
of a target state, they would still have to get through its air 
defense before being able to hit the intended targets. When 
TNWs are removed from European soil, the United States’ 
strategic nuclear weapons, or even those of the United 
Kingdom or France, can still comfortably fulfill the role of 
NATO’s nuclear deterrent. If a remote nuclear guarantee is 
good enough for South Korea and Japan, it surely will be 
good enough for America’s European allies.
Nuclear weapons and international stability
Nuclear weapons are widely credited with bringing stabil-
ity to the international system. The prospect of nuclear 
Armageddon makes states cautious and dramatically decreas-
es the odds of war, particularly between major powers. Even 
nuclear pessimists accept the pacifying effects of nuclear 
weapons as a given, often focusing their critique on safety 
risks and moral and legal objections.
Lowther & Schumacher celebrate the stabilizing effects of nu-
clear weapons as well, providing evidence of this by consider-
ing data on the number of fatalities caused by conflicts since 
the year 1600 (see figure 1). They observe that between 1600 
and 1945 an average of 1-2 percent of the world’s population 
died from war annually, whereas the percentage dropped to 
0.3 percent after the invention of the bomb in 1945. They 
claim a 90 percent reduction in the number of conflict-related 
deaths and triumphantly conclude that the presence of nu-
clear weapons must be the root cause thereof.
Unfortunately, this statement misrepresents the facts. 
Whereas a 90 percent decrease in fatalities might sound like 
revolutionary change, it did not happen overnight. Figure 
During the Cold War the two superpowers and their allies 
managed to avoided direct confrontation with one another. 
This however is not to say that nuclear powers do not fi ght 
at all. On the contrary, a 2009 study found that states with 
nuclear weapons are more likely to use force, to engage in 
militarized disputes, and to be involved in uses of force that 
result in fatalities.7
The same study also found that while all-out war is less 
likely when both sides have nuclear weapons, nuclear states 
are much more likely to engage each other in confl icts of 
lower intensity. Think about it, throughout the Cold War the 
United States and the Soviet Union were involved in numer-
ous proxy wars, causing millions of casualties — the Korean 
War, the Vietnam War, and the Afghan-Soviet War, to name 
but a few. 
Finally, the study revealed that full-blown wars and lower-
intensity confl icts are more likely to occur between a state 
that possesses nuclear weapons and a state that does not. 
The historical record refl ects this as there are numerous ex-
amples of nuclear and non-nuclear states fi ghting each other 
— think of the Chinese fi ghting American forces in Korea, 
Egypt and Syria attacking Israel during the Yom Kippur War, 
the North Vietnamese fi ghting the United States in Vietnam, 
and Argentina invading and occupying the British-controlled 
Falkland Islands.
NATO and nuclear weapons: the next step?
As discussed above, nuclear weapons are not as essential to 
the security of the Atlantic alliance and its members, or the 
stability of the world, as conventional wisdom would have 
us believe. Nonetheless, nuclear weapons still exist in large 
numbers and it is unlikely that any nuclear state — includ-
ing those that are part of NATO — will renounce them com-
pletely anytime soon. As the risk of the spread of nuclear 
weapons to new states has remained a key concern over the 
past two decades, it is of the utmost importance that the 
United States and its European allies set an example and de-
crease their own unnecessary reliance on nuclear weapons.
The US nuclear triad
Currently, the United States relies on a nuclear-triad, 
consisting of three components, namely strategic bombers, 
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Following 
New START (the 2010 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), 
the United States and Russia are allowed to deploy 1,550 
nuclear warheads on 700 missiles and bombers, with thou-
1 clearly shows a declining trend in the number of confl ict-
related deaths since 1600. Wartime fatalities dropped nearly 
50 percent after the 17th and 18th century and dropped 
another 70 percent after World War II.
We can better understand whether the world has become 
less confl ict-prone by considering more detailed data than 
the basic fi gure provided by Lowther & Schumacher. Most 
of the available confl ict data is from the post-1945 period. 
For our purposes we need to go back further. Peter Brecke’s 
Confl ict Catalog allows us to look at the number of confl icts 
per decade between 1400 and 2000 in Europe, for which the 
most reliable data is available (see fi gure 2).4 While there 
is quite a bit of variation in the number of confl icts per 
decade, a declining trend over the past 600 years is discern-
ible. This does not mean to say that the presence of nuclear 
weapons has no effect on the way that states behave, but it 
is not as evident that nuclear weapons are the prime cause 
of a more stable post-WW II world as is so often assumed.5
Do nuclear weapons lead to less confl ict? 
Considering recent history, it may very well be true that di-
rect confl ict between two nuclear-armed powers is unlikely.6 
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possession of nuclear weapons places the consequences of 
losing escalatory control in a conflict front and center in the 
minds of national leaders. The risks of a nuclear holocaust 
become too high to take chances, which leave nuclear weap-
ons states much less willing to pursue aggressive foreign 
Perhaps the best evidence is found in the data measuring 
the number of conflict related deaths (civilian and military). 
According to an analysis conducted by the U.S. Strategic 
Command, between 1600 and 1945 an average of 1-2 per 
cent of the world’s population (combatants and civilians) 
perished in war every year. After the invention of the atomic 
bomb, that percentage declined to around 0.3 per cent of 
weapons have also causes nuclear powers to restrain their 
allies — preventing additional conflicts. This promotes 
greater international stability.
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including related personnel costs, at an estimated price 
tag of $200 million annually for each of the six airbases in 
Europe. Moreover, the cost of upgrading and extending the 
life of the B-61 has more than doubled to nearly $11 billion 
according to recent Pentagon estimates. At the same time, 
maintaining forward-deployed TNWs requires European allies 
to continue investing in expensive dual-capable aircraft and 
training personnel to conduct hypothetical nuclear missions. 
The Netherlands and Belgium are slated to replace their 
current fleet of F-16s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. This 
choice is undoubtedly associated with the F-35’s ability to 
fulfill a nuclear task and the planned modification of the 
B-61 to fit the aircraft. During this time of unprecedented 
fiscal austerity and deep cuts in defense expenditures it 
is irresponsible to continue funding TNWs that add next 
to nothing to Europe’s security, while the money could be 
spent on systems that are more useful to NATO’s current and 
future tasks.
Second, the withdrawal of TNWs in Europe may convince 
Russia to start decreasing its own tactical nuclear arsenal. 
Current US and NATO policy is to make withdrawal contin-
gent on a reduction in the number of Russian TNWs and 
their removal away from Russia’s western borders. Russia, 
on the other hand, insists that American TNWs first be 
withdrawn from Europe before having any discussion about 
Russia’s tactical weapons, a demand that goes back to 
Soviet times. Linking the removal of American weapons to 
Russian reciprocity is not only strategically redundant (after 
all deterrence will remain intact after withdrawal) but also 
displays a disturbing misunderstanding of security dilemma 
dynamics. It is dangerous to assume that Russian policy-
makers understand that NATO intentions are defensive and 
pacific, and subsequently interpret Russia’s maintenance 
of a large (but ultimately useless) number of TNWs near 
NATO borders as an indication of hostile intent. By remov-
ing American weapons from Europe, NATO signals that it is 
sensitive to Russian security concerns. After all, it is NATO 
A bomb rack with B-61 tactical nuclear weapons. According to the author, the most feasible and long overdue step that the United 
States and its European allies can take is to finally withdraw the roughly 200 B-61 tactical nuclear weapons stationed on European soil 
(photo: U.S. Department of Defense)
sands more in reserve. While this number is lower than at 
any time since the earliest days of the Cold War, it is still far 
more than is conceivably required for deterrence. The cost 
of maintaining and upgrading this arsenal and the necessary 
delivery systems will cost the American taxpayer $1 trillion 
over the next thirty years by conservative estimates.8
If the current arsenal is overkill, what is a realistic number? 
Deterrence does not require a state to be able to launch a 
thousand warheads over the course of half an hour. For sta-
ble deterrence it is unnecessary to be able to wipe out half 
of Russia’s population. Even if only a handful of missiles 
would successfully hit, say, Russia’s five largest cities in a 
retaliatory strike, it would kill millions of people and wipe 
out a substantial part of Russia’s industrial capacity. Given 
that no state other than Russia has more than 300 strategic 
nuclear warheads, the United States’ arsenal seems excessive 
in comparison. In a 2010 New York Times op-ed, two Air 
Force experts argued that the United States could comforta-
bly get by with 311 strategic nuclear weapons.9 The authors 
of a recent Cato Institute study argued that the American 
nuclear triad is an unnecessary product of bureaucratic com-
petition between the different branches of the armed forces 
throughout the Cold 
War — each compet-
ing for relevance 
and a share of the 
defense budget — 
aided by an exag-
geration of Soviet 
military capabilities. 
They contended that 
replacing the current 
triad with a subma-
rine-based monad, 
the least vulnerable of the three legs of the triad, will save 
the United States an estimated $20 billion annually for 
many years to come whilst leaving deterrence intact.10
Tactical nuclear weapons in Europe
The most feasible and long overdue step that the United 
States and its European allies can take is to finally withdraw 
the roughly 200 B-61 tactical nuclear weapons stationed on 
European soil. As was discussed above, these weapons serve 
no military purpose whatsoever, while removing them offers 
many benefits.
First, there is the matter of the cost of maintaining nuclear 
weapons in Europe. Currently, the US bears the expenses 
for producing, transporting, and maintaining the weapons, 
A nuclear deterrent 
only deters when 
vital interests — 
survival — are at 
stake
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that retains forward-deployed nuclear weapons on the soil of 
European non-nuclear weapon states, despite the question-
able nature of such an arrangement under the provisions of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), whereas Russia maintains 
its nuclear weapons within its own borders. Withdrawal 
removes Russia’s reasoning for not wanting to talk about the 
relocation and reduction of TNWs and creates an atmosphere 
conducive to negotiating a complete ban on this class of 
nuclear weapons.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, withdrawal will show 
that NATO members are serious about their disarmament 
obligations under Article VI of the NPT and will strengthen 
the prevailing taboo that rests on the acquisition and use of 
nuclear weapons. At first sight, the removal of 200 nuclear 
weapons might seem inconsequential when it comes to stop-
ping the spread of nuclear weapons. But think about the 
absurdity of, say, the German and Italian foreign ministers 
lecturing their Iranian counterpart about proliferation when 
their own countries host nuclear weapons. Maintaining TNWs 
in Europe sends the message that nuclear weapons have 
military and political value; one should thus not be sur-
prised if an insecure state were to succumb to the tempta-
tion of obtaining them. Of course, the issue of delegitimiz-
ing nuclear weapons goes much further than their removal 
from European soil. In the context of NATO it is also about 
the continued reliance on strategic nuclear forces as the 
supreme guarantee of the alliance’s security as confirmed in 
the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept and, more fundamentally, 
about the retention of any nuclear weapons by their current 
owners. Nonetheless, the withdrawal of forward-deployed 
TNWs will serve as a significant gesture to non-nuclear 
weapon states that have been complaining about a lack of 
progress on nuclear disarmament.
Conclusion
For far too long we have allowed bogus arguments, ques-
tionable data, and fuzzy analogies to cloud our thinking 
when it comes to the role of nuclear weapons in maintain-
ing the security of the Atlantic alliance. During the Cold 
War these weapons might have seemed a necessary evil, 
but with the North-Atlantic region facing new challenges it 
is time to scale down NATO’s reliance on these relics from 
the Cold War. While complete nuclear disarmament might 
seem a distant vision, the United States and its NATO allies 
can take meaningful steps towards disarmament. Instead 
of spending an arm and a leg on maintaining and upgrad-
ing its nuclear triad, the US should make unprecedented 
cuts in the number of strategic nuclear weapons it has 
deployed and consider retiring the land and air-based legs 
of its triad in favor of a submarine-based monad. Doing 
so neither affects the invulnerability of its nuclear force 
nor the ability to conduct retaliatory strikes, while sav-
ing as much as $20 billion annually. More importantly, 
NATO should withdraw American forward-deployed tactical 
nuclear weapons in Europe. These weapons are irrelevant 
to NATO’s deterrence task but are a financial burden on the 
US and the European host nations. Moreover, they continue 
to play a spoiler role in NATO-Russia disarmament talks and 
make it unnecessarily difficult for European NATO members 
to hold other states accountable for violations of their 
non-proliferation obligations.
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Would you like to react? 
Mail the editor: redactie@atlcom.nl. 
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